Obama and his Iraq policy

Even George Packer in the July 7 & 14, 2008 "New Yorker" magazine concedes, begrudgingly, that Senator Obama, the presumptive Democratic candidate for President, will have to change his policy on Iraq. Since the beginning of his candidacy Senator Obama has had what I have called a take-my-ball-and-go-home Iraq policy. His policy, as stated to everyone who would listen, was to withdraw, and continue to withdraw, U.S. forces from Iraq regardless of the circumstances on the ground.

Obviously, this policy was politically popular with a portion of the Democratic Party electorate. Supporters of this policy irresponsibly disregarded the impact of a precipitous withdrawal on the poor, long suffering Iraqi populace. But the human rights of the Iraqi citizens never were a consideration in this policy. The Iraqis couldn't take their ball and go home - they were stuck there.

In an unprecedented move, Packer actually gave some credit to President Bush, but in the most off-handed manner imaginable. "The improved conditions [in Iraq] can be attributed, in increasing order of importance, to President Bush's surge, the change in military strategy under General David Petraeus, the turning of Sunni tribes against Al Qaeda, the Sadr militia's unilateral ceasefire, and the great historical luck that brought them all together at the same moment."

In 2006 I endured many a Packer essay on Iraq - full of vitriol toward Bush, disdain toward the U.S. government's Iraq policy and unrelentingly pessimistic about any kind of favorable outcome in that tormented country (I endure these essays, and others, so that my own beliefs may be challenged and thereby strengthened - or changed). That is why I see the paragraph above as an almost pathetic argument, undeserving of publication in a a great magazine like "The New Yorker" (almost like a fan walking out of Yankee Stadium bleating that the Red Sox only won because they were lucky). There is an old sports saying about luck (in my part of the world, anyway) - "You make your own breaks."

Let's address these five issues; in reverse order, that is, to the order that Packer presented them. First, to say that the vastly improving situation in Iraq is due to luck is to discount the hard work and effort of tens if not hundreds of thousands of individuals who have contributed months if not years to the success of this endeavor. As we shall see, luck had little to do with it. Packer calls it luck because he is unable to admit that he is wrong.

Secondly, the turning of the Sunni tribes against Al Qaeda was long overdue, and I have written about this before (see my May 2007 post). The Sunni are a minority population in an oil rich country, yet no oil lies in the Sunni dominated provinces. The only chance that the Sunnis have of enjoying any prosperity in the future is as a part of the country of Iraq. That they have been particularly stubborn about admitting this fact has always been a mystery to me. The introduction of Al Qaeda into their communities was the shock that startled the Sunni out of their coma and allowed them to see where their bests interests lay. But most importantly, luck was not the reason that alert military commanders on the ground recognized the change in attitudes among the Sunni tribesmen and moved quickly to capitalize on it.

To say that the unilateral ceasefire by the Sadr militia was a random act of kindness by the volatile firebrand is odd. Sadr had been sending his Legions into the Valley of Death since 2004 without effect. He has declared a "unilateral" ceasefire because he knew that he would be slapped down quickly, just like all the other times he had tried to assert any authority.

That leaves us to the final two points: the new strategy and the surge. That the U.S. military entered Iraq in 2003 without a robust plan for the occupation or an effective plan for the ensuing insurgency was certainly bad luck for President Bush, but very few pundits or critics characterized it that way. Consequently, luck played no part in the fact that the military learned from their mistakes, developed a new counterinsurgency strategy, and then implemented this strategy boldly and effectively.

I agree with George Packer's reasons for the current success in Iraq, although I strongly disagree with his order of priority. The current success begins and ends with President Bush's decision to surge U.S. combat brigades into Iraq. That was a tough decision, not only because the political reaction was so strong, but because the burden fell heavily on the lives of so many service men and women and their families.

A former commanding general of mine used to tell us, "We are at war, more is expected of soldiers." When I heard him speak that statement I had been in the military for twenty seven years without seeing combat. When the time came, his words signaled to me what I needed to do, and how I needed to act.

So too did President Bush's decision to launch the surge send a signal to friend and foe alike. The signal to General Petraeus and his soldiers was to move forward and get the job done. The signal to the Sunni tribesmen was to join the winning side. The signal to Sadr was that this was not a man to be messed with. The conveyance of these messages was not a matter of luck but of deliberate intent.

Senator Obama has to make a decision. Will he do as he has accused President Bush of doing, to continue despite all evidence to support a failed policy? Will he see Iraq through the eyes of George Packer, who says that"[t]here will be no such thing as victory in Iraq?" Will he stand up to the Moveon.org crowd (now that they have helped assure his election) and leave the U.S. troops in Iraq long enough to see the job through, or will he stuff the Iraqi people into a sturdy sack with a heavy stone and toss them into the river?

The Iraqi people could use a bit of luck. They deserve it.

On understanding the war - Part 1

There are a lot of things that I still don't understand about the war In iraq. A common theme for me in these posts, a recurring question that has pestered me since before the war was: Why wasn't there a plan for the occupation? Why did the same people who brilliantly planned the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq do such a miserable job of planning the occupation of Iraq? Why did the occupation go so badly? Why did the problems in the occupation look, initially, eerily the same as the problems encountered in Panama after Operation Just Cause?

There has been a lot of commentary about this question and I have actually read some of it. We have heard from General Tommy Franks, the Commander of Central Command during these operations. Until now, we have not heard from the top leaders in the Defense Department, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Richard Myers, Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith, and most importantly, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

Secretary Rumsfeld was clearly in charge at the Defense Department and he took an active and detailed interest in the war plans for these two operations. Whatever was produced was done under his specific guidance and direction. Whatever the plans did or failed to do were his responsibility. When it comes to the occupation of Iraq, this is not a question of a good plan poorly executed. This is not even a bad plan badly executed. What happened in Iraq was that everyone, military and civilian, separately and in some case individually, in the absence of any guidance from above, examined the situation facing them and come up with their own plan.

Why did this happen? I really want to read Don Rumsfeld's account of the rationale in his mind during the planning for the war. Rumsfeld was not stupid. He was extremely bright, with considerable knowledge and experience, and had the benefit of brilliant people advising him. I hope Rumsfeld is busy writing his memoir of the war as we speak.

In the meantime I will have to make do with one of Rumsfeld's brilliant advisers: Douglas Feith. Mr. Feith was the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy from 2001 to 2005. He has written a book, "War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the dawn of the War on Terrorism." I have started reading this book, looking for answers. If I find any, I will let you know.

Memorial Day - remembering the fallen

I first met Bob Zangas in Kuwait at the start of the war. He was a Marine Corp Lieutenant Colonel, a Reservist, and part of the civil affairs contingent for the First Marine Division. He and I were waiting in Kuwait while the invading army sliced through the hapless Iraqi Army on the way to Baghdad. We worked on a project together and I got to know him. After I moved to Camp Babylon Bob moved to the provincial capital of Al Kut. I was able to see him a few more times before he rotated home in September 2003 with the rest of the Marines.

Bob Zangas (r), myself (c) and an Iraqi translator (l) in Iraq in January 2004.

I first met Fern Holland at the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) South Central Office at the Hotel Babylon in Hilla in the fall of 2003. Fern, a lawyer from Oklahoma, was assigned to the office to promote women's rights in the south central region of Iraq. Fern came across to me as a very attractive, very intense young woman. We were going in different directions during the day so I rarely spoke more than a few words to her, and that was mostly in passing, in places like the dining facility. Such a woman, assigned to perform such a mission, caused some eye rolling among some of the men at the Office. But, since the promotion of women's rights in Iraq was a priority for Ambassador Bremer and the CPA, such editorial comments were limited.

Salwa Oumashi was an Iraqi translator who worked for Fern. According to a New York Times article on these two women, Salwa had lived in the United States. One evening, during a social function on the third floor of the Hotel Babylon, I was able to have a nice, long discussion with Salwa. I took away the impression that she was very committed to her job.

Fern Holland (r), Salwa Oumashi (2nd from r) and myself (l) showing a picture of my family that I kept in my helmet to a group of women at the Karbala Women's Rights Center in Karbala, Iraq, in February 2004.

In December 2003 I was standing in the CPA compound when I saw Bob Zangas, dressed in civilian clothes. After Bob completed his initial tour and the Marine Corp Reserve returned him to civilian life, Bob volunteered to return to Iraq as a civilian employee of the CPA. He was assigned to our South Central Office with the task of building the capacity of the Iraqi media. Although I could not imagine volunteering to return to Iraq the act seemed to go along with the boundless enthusiasm Bob had for his new job and the unlimited optimism he had for the future of the Iraqi people.

The CPA South Central compound where I worked from October 2003 to February 2004 was comprised of primarily civilian employees of CPA or Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR), the contractor responsible for providing our logistical support. Most of the cooks and servers in our dining facility were Pakistanis who lived right there in the compound. The men who protected our perimeter and guarded us while we slept were contracted Nepalese, former Gurkhas in the British Army.

Other than a small contingent of Military Police, my Team of five civil affairs soldiers were the only other soldiers on the compound. This became important because we were armed, and could provide our own protection, and we traveled frequently to the five provincial capitals in our area. KBR would often check our schedule and ask if we would escort truckloads of supplies to one of the outlying CPA offices. I didn't want my job to be escorting supply convoys, but I saw no reason that we couldn't occasionally lend a hand.

So it was that one day in January 2004 Bob Zangas came to me and asked if he could accompany us to Ad Diwaniyah and would we stop by a dairy in the area? The dairy was a beneficiary of a CPA project, and Bob wanted do a media story on the project. I thought the task supported the war effort and I agreed to help. In February 2004 Fern asked if she and Salwa could ride along with me on a trip to check on the progress of the construction at the Karbala Women's Rights Center. Later that month Ambassador Bremer came to Karbala to the inauguration of this center.

On February 28, 2004 I left CPA South Central to return to Kuwait and eventually an airplane ride home. With our departure Fern, Salwa and Bob were forced to decide whether they could do their jobs inside the compound or be forced to travel outside, unprotected. I had already observed by their actions that Fern and Bob were prepared to take more risks than I was. Any risks that I took, of course, subjected my soldiers to the same risk. Bob was responsible only to himself. Where ever Fern went she was accompanied by Salwa. I was not privy to any conversations that these women had about the risks that they were taking.

Some could argue that they were braver than I was, or more foolish. Others would say that both sides of the argument are correct. The net result was that on March 9, 2004, ten days after I left Iraq, while returning from a visit to the Karabala Women's Rights Center, Fern Holland, Salwa Oumashi and Robert Zangas were ambushed and killed in their vehicle by a hail of AK - 47 bullets.

I know that Memorial Day is to honor fallen American soldiers, but whenever I think of someone who was killed in Iraq Fern, Salwa and Bob come to mind. They and their families sacrificed for this war. 

Iraqi attitudes about America

The Kurdish people of Iraq suffered under Saddam Hussein. And we fought and died alongside Americans to liberate our country. There is no ambiguity about the depth of gratitude that Kurds feel for America's sacrifices in Iraq. Americans who have been killed or wounded in Iraq are heroes to me and to all of Iraq's Kurds. We will never forget what you have done for us.

- NECHIRVAN BARZANI, Prime Minister of Kurdistan, in the Wall Street Journal

Reading this quote in the WSJ almost brought tears to my eyes. Cynics would say that the cynical and crafty Barzani was trying to manipulate American public opinion (as he manipulated mine). Politicians (and Barzani, whom I have never met or even seen, is a politician) will say a lot of things, true or untrue, for a lot of reasons. Whether Barzani personally believed these words or not, I am glad and grateful that he said them.

Unlike most Americans, who have never met an Iraqi, much less a grateful one, I had a number of Iraqis shake my hand, look me in the eye and thank me for helping to get rid of Saddam. I had a much better impression of Iraqis when I left Iraq, after ten months of closely observing their behavior, than when I arrived. I have been around the world and have visited dozens of countries, so I had some basis upon which I could make comparisons.

Yet, evaluating the Iraqis wasn't very hard. They were industrious. They had a work ethic and wanted to do well at their job. I could see that as I traveled through the cities and watched thousands of Iraqis diligently performing thousands of different, sometimes humble, tasks. They were religious, and publicly made great sacrifices for their faith. I passed many Iraqis walking through the desert on a pilgrimage to a holy site. The really interesting part was that other Iraqis in cities along their path were obligated by their faith to provide food and water to the pilgrims. Finally, they were family oriented. On holidays, the Iraqi family would parade in the park, the father holding the young daughter while the wife led the son by the hand.

There are many people in my country, great Americans, with great compassion for anyone and everyone, who would toss this Iraqi family over the side in their great haste to see the American military withdrawn from Iraq, immediately and regardless of the consequences. Or so it appears to me based on statements of certain popular American politicians. I call it the "Take my ball and go home policy." Or so it appears to me.

I respectfully disagree.

The Governor's Hurricane Conference

I joined several thousand others in attending the Governor's Hurricane Conference in Ft. Lauderdale last week. For the second year in a row, those of us who are members of the State Emergency Response Team were forced to monitor wildfire outbreaks throughout the state while we attended the conference. Fortunately the counties and the state Division of Forestry were able to manage with very little additional state assistance.

The most interesting presentation was by Mike Womack from the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, although very little of the information he presented made the media. He gave us all an update on the progress Mississippi is making in rebuilding two and a half years after Hurricane Katrina. At the beginning of his presentation he asked those of us in the room who had responded to Mississippi after Katrina to stand. I felt good that I had responded and was very interested in the progress that Mississippi had made.

His presentations made clear the difficulties in recovering from such a catastrophe. The delay in rebuilding is often attributed to FEMA bureaucracy and incompetence but the truth lies more in the staggering logistical difficulties of the task and the need for state and local officials to make difficult decisions that often alienate certain constituencies. Vast sums of federal dollars are made available for rebuilding but these dollars must be spent sequentially and not all at once. The buildings can't be constructed until the roads are repaired. The roads cannot be rebuilt until the utilities are laid. The utilities can't be installed until the debris is removed and the debris removal took almost two years.

Why so long for the debris? Just load it onto a truck and haul it away, right? But where? You can't just dump it all in the ocean. The local landfills cannot hold the staggering quantity of tonnage involved. Much of the area was contaminated by the storm surge with a toxic soup of petroleum, chemicals and sewage. The casino barges that were transported inland by the storm had to be cut into manageable pieces. Damaged structures had to be torn down. Automobiles and trucks had to be hauled away and stripped so that the steel could be salvaged.

Plus, local officials had to educate their communities about the rebuilding options. Should the communities be rebuilt as they were, to be destroyed again with the next storm? Or should the buildings be elevated, at much greater expense? Many of the public buildings, like schools, were rebuilt north of Interstate 10 so that they could be used as risk shelters. New land had to be found and in some cases purchased to accommodate these schools.

Many Floridians believe that the storms of 2004 and 2005 have prepared the citizens of our state for the hurricanes to come. Yet, none of those storms were as catastrophic as Katrina. The time may come when we will have to face the grim and difficult decisions faced by the people of Mississippi.

National Hurricane Conference

The National Hurricane Conference was held the first week of April at the Rosen Center in Orlando. I attended as a part of my job as an emergency manager for the state of Florida. The Conference last year, which I also attended, was held in New Orleans, La.



What was remarkable about this year's conference was the contrasts, the simultaneous feeling that so much has been improved since Hurricane Katrina and yet so many problems remain unchanged. The unfortunate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was displayed on television and in numerous other media accounts as well as multiple after action reviews by the White House, the Congress, and other agencies. Congress thoroughly examined the mistakes that were made and attempted to correct them in the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, which was passed by Congress and signed in law by President Bush on October 4, 2006.



The emergency management community at the local, state and federal levels has been extremely busy implementing this law since it was passed. We are still not finished. The reason we aren't finished is due to the breadth and complexity of the changes that were implemented. Secondly, FEMA had to develop, test and implement a lot of new programs to comply with this act. Once these programs were developed, the state and local emergency management had to modify their emergency plans to incorporate these new federal strategies. In the last year I have been extremely busy coordinating, updating and writing emergency plans.



In many ways we are better prepared to handle the next catastrophe. Unfortunately, in many areas we, as a nation, are not. As hard as it might be to forget the terrible images of Hurricane Katrina many of the public have been able to do so. Two straight hurricane seasons without a major impact on the United States has allowed complacency to reinstate itself as king of emergency management in many of our communities. One good example came from the insurance industry presentation. In Mississippi in 2006 the number of flood insurance policies writen in 2006, the year after Katrina, was up by 39%. By 2007, however, most of those new policies were allowed to lapse.

The emergency management community is much better prepared now that we were in 2003. We had a lot of practice in 2004 and 2005, and we've done a lot of written a lot of new plans in 2006 and 2007. But like any other industry, there has been a turnover in experienced people. The State Emergency Response Team in Florida that did such a great job of responding to Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi and then Hurricane Wilma in south Florida is taking the field this hurricane season with a lot of new faces.

Regardless of how prepared we are,if the citizens don't do their part to get a plan and be prepared, then the next big disaster could result in more needless suffering.