I have been on the road the last two weeks advancing the cause of national mass care capacity, courtesy of FEMA funding and the knowledge that Florida will need to draw on this national capacity should a catastrophic event strike the state. In my humble opinion our national mass care capacity has been hindered by two significant shortfalls: a lack of mass care coordination capability at the state level and a lack of integration of mass care voluntary agencies into emergency management at all levels of government.
Providing shelter and food to survivors is the primary role of mass care in a disaster. The capacity to deliver this mass care role has traditionally been provided by the large voluntary organizations like the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army and the Southern Baptist Convention. These agencies have national organizations, mobile equipment, legions of trained volunteers, and full-time staff with the expertise to marshall these resources at a disaster location in order to feed and shelter the survivors.
These organizations respond to hundreds of incidents requiring mass care support every day. My very own Capital Area Chapter of the American Red Cross in Tallahassee responded yesterday to a multi-unit apartment fire, and was on hand with an Emergency Response Vehicle to assist both the firefighters and affected occupants of the buildings. I donate monthly to my local Red Cross Chapter, as do many others, so that this capability will be there when needed.
When the disaster is greater than the local capacities of the voluntary organizations, then they call on their national organizations, bringing in personnel, equipment and organizational expertise gained from multiple responses across the country. But what happens when the disaster is catastrophic, when the mass care capacity required for the event exceeds the available national resources of the voluntary agencies?
This is where the overall lack of state mass care capacity comes in. If the event exceeds the capabilities of the voluntary agencies then the affected state must either provide resources to address the shortages, or request additional resources from the federal government through FEMA, or both. Unfortunately, because catastrophic events are so rare, most states not only have no one trained to perform this critical function, they have no one identified to perform this critical coordination role in a disaster.
Due to fate and circumstances, I received considerable experience in the role of state mass care coordination when I was involved in the response to eight hurricanes during 2004 and 2005. FEMA provided me the opportunity to assist in the development of a state mass care planning course, and then serve as one of the instructors for the pilot course June 8-9 in Lake Mary, Florida. State mass care planners from 11 states in 4 FEMA Regions were on hand for the pilot, and I think FEMA did more to enhance state mass care capacity in those two days than they have done in the last year.
Now that we have completed and tested a two day planning course, we will develop a two day state mass care operations course. If we don't get too tied up with hurricanes between now and the end of the year, we should have the operations course ready to pilot by the beginning of next year.
As for the lack of integration of mass care voluntary agencies into emergency management at all levels of government, we am working on that, too. I will explain what we are doing in a later post.
Saturday, June 19, 2010
Saturday, May 15, 2010
"Senator's Son" by Luke Larson: a novel of the Iraq war
During the ten months that I spent in Iraq I kept telling myself that I would write a novel based on my experiences. Beginning in the summer of 2004, after I returned from the war zone, I began working on a manuscript and am still slaving away on my third (or is it fourth?) draft. Despite the handicap of being a Marine (or maybe because of it), Luke Larson has written a true "insider novel" documenting a key turning point in the Iraq war: the Awakening of the Sunni tribes in Anbar province.
Bing West, in his outstanding book on the "surge," the Awakening and General Petraeus, entitled "The Strongest Tribe", outlined the big picture on the important and critical change in strategy implemented by the United States in Iraq in 2006-2007. As a Marine infantry officer on the ground in Ramadi, Iraq during this period, Luke Larson experienced first-hand the problems of the previous strategy and the remarkable results that became manifest when the strategy changed. Luke did a skillful job in his novel of explaining why the strategy was changed and why the new strategy was successful.
Larsen is much more proficient in infantry tactics and counterinsurgency warfare than he is in the craft of writing a novel, although the literary deficiencies are a distraction rather than an obstacle to the reader's ability to absorb and understand the many important messages that the author conveys.
In 2008 I wrote 3 posts on writing a war novel (see On Writing a War Novel, Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3). One of the big problems with writing a novel showing "how it really was over there" is that the military is a subculture of the larger society. The Army (and to a much greater extent, the Marines) is a subculture of the military, and the servicemen and women serving in Iraq occupied another subculture of their own branch of the military. Each subculture has different acronyms, folkways and mores. To translate this reality so that the average reader would understand is like translating from one language to another. In the process, a lot is lost.
Luke endeavors mightily to overcome this issue, and mostly succeeds, although I am a poor one to judge in this area. My service in the Army and in Iraq gave me a greater depth and breadth of understanding of what the Marines in Luke's novel faced. I have actually been to Ramadi, but I wasn't kicking down any doors while I was there, either. Thankfully, I never faced the intense combat described in "Senator's Son."
A good indicator of some one's combat experience can be determined by asking them how often they were scared. This is an inexact science, since many people have different definitions of the word "scared." The Army asked me this question in a survey while I was out processing in Kuwait prior to coming home. I answered bravely that I had not been afraid when I was in Iraq, but I think I may have lied. I believe that Luke Larson was scared many times when he was in Iraq. The Marines that he so winningly brings to life in his novel spend a lot of time being scared, whether they admit it to themselves or their buddies, or whether they continue on feeling that they must be brave.
This book is about what it was like to be in Iraq during the toughest days, in one of the toughest neighborhoods. But it's hard for me to tell how real it is. I wasn't there.
Bing West, in his outstanding book on the "surge," the Awakening and General Petraeus, entitled "The Strongest Tribe", outlined the big picture on the important and critical change in strategy implemented by the United States in Iraq in 2006-2007. As a Marine infantry officer on the ground in Ramadi, Iraq during this period, Luke Larson experienced first-hand the problems of the previous strategy and the remarkable results that became manifest when the strategy changed. Luke did a skillful job in his novel of explaining why the strategy was changed and why the new strategy was successful.
Larsen is much more proficient in infantry tactics and counterinsurgency warfare than he is in the craft of writing a novel, although the literary deficiencies are a distraction rather than an obstacle to the reader's ability to absorb and understand the many important messages that the author conveys.
In 2008 I wrote 3 posts on writing a war novel (see On Writing a War Novel, Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3). One of the big problems with writing a novel showing "how it really was over there" is that the military is a subculture of the larger society. The Army (and to a much greater extent, the Marines) is a subculture of the military, and the servicemen and women serving in Iraq occupied another subculture of their own branch of the military. Each subculture has different acronyms, folkways and mores. To translate this reality so that the average reader would understand is like translating from one language to another. In the process, a lot is lost.
Luke endeavors mightily to overcome this issue, and mostly succeeds, although I am a poor one to judge in this area. My service in the Army and in Iraq gave me a greater depth and breadth of understanding of what the Marines in Luke's novel faced. I have actually been to Ramadi, but I wasn't kicking down any doors while I was there, either. Thankfully, I never faced the intense combat described in "Senator's Son."
A good indicator of some one's combat experience can be determined by asking them how often they were scared. This is an inexact science, since many people have different definitions of the word "scared." The Army asked me this question in a survey while I was out processing in Kuwait prior to coming home. I answered bravely that I had not been afraid when I was in Iraq, but I think I may have lied. I believe that Luke Larson was scared many times when he was in Iraq. The Marines that he so winningly brings to life in his novel spend a lot of time being scared, whether they admit it to themselves or their buddies, or whether they continue on feeling that they must be brave.
This book is about what it was like to be in Iraq during the toughest days, in one of the toughest neighborhoods. But it's hard for me to tell how real it is. I wasn't there.
Saturday, April 24, 2010
Blaming Iraqis for what Bush has done
While reading the voluminous comments to a NYT article on the Iraqi election I noticed that many of our citizens continue to spew vitriol and hatred toward President Bush, even though he has passed from the world stage. One wonders if they will carry such grudges with them for the rest of their life. As for myself, I have mostly forgiven or forgotten Bill Clinton's many transgressions. At least with Slick Willie, unlike Tricky Dick, there was the relief and satisfaction of an impeachment.
Unfortunately, the unrepentant Bush-haters associate Iraq with their grievances, and must by their arguments inflict collateral damage on the poor, long-suffering Iraqi populace. Iraq and Iraqis are associated with their list of Bush "crimes", and must receive some of the blame. The situation is somewhat similar to the actions of the anti-Viet Nam war crowd in the sixties and seventies. In their righteous fury over the war they released their anger on the nearest object available, spewing profanity and saliva in greeting to hapless, battle-scarred nineteen-year-old Viet Nam veterans as they debarked back home from the jungle. Although I did not fight in that war, I will carry an unforgiven and unforgotten grudge against those righteous ones for the rest of my life. Fortunately, the returning Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans have not been subjected to similar offenses.
The fact that Iraqi success with democracy would vindicate (even if only in a small way) Bush causes his detractors to denigrate any signs of Iraqi progress. Personally, I believe that a successful, democratic Iraq would vindicate Bush in a big way. From my experience living in Iraq and the considerable study I have undertaken in the years since then, I believe that the Iraqis will be successful. The benefits of unity that strain to hold the many factions together in one country are greater than the centrifugal forces of dissolution. The constant and common interaction of the Iraqis with the numerous Iranian pilgrims has thoroughly indoctrinated them on the perils of rule by the mullahs.
Finally, and most importantly, I learned through my own observation that the Iraqis are intelligent, religious and hard-working, qualities that can take them a long way in overcoming their present and past difficulties. I heard an Iraqi sheik say that his people had been traumatized by Saddam for thirty years, and we Americans should make allowances for that. Many of their current problems are manifestations of that trauma.
Their elections and political interactions may not meet our elevated standards, but they are at least as good or better than the elections we conducted in Chicago in the 1930's. And if you still insist on hating Bush, that is your right to continue to waste your time in that manner. Just don't blame the Iraqis for what Bush has done.
Unfortunately, the unrepentant Bush-haters associate Iraq with their grievances, and must by their arguments inflict collateral damage on the poor, long-suffering Iraqi populace. Iraq and Iraqis are associated with their list of Bush "crimes", and must receive some of the blame. The situation is somewhat similar to the actions of the anti-Viet Nam war crowd in the sixties and seventies. In their righteous fury over the war they released their anger on the nearest object available, spewing profanity and saliva in greeting to hapless, battle-scarred nineteen-year-old Viet Nam veterans as they debarked back home from the jungle. Although I did not fight in that war, I will carry an unforgiven and unforgotten grudge against those righteous ones for the rest of my life. Fortunately, the returning Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans have not been subjected to similar offenses.
The fact that Iraqi success with democracy would vindicate (even if only in a small way) Bush causes his detractors to denigrate any signs of Iraqi progress. Personally, I believe that a successful, democratic Iraq would vindicate Bush in a big way. From my experience living in Iraq and the considerable study I have undertaken in the years since then, I believe that the Iraqis will be successful. The benefits of unity that strain to hold the many factions together in one country are greater than the centrifugal forces of dissolution. The constant and common interaction of the Iraqis with the numerous Iranian pilgrims has thoroughly indoctrinated them on the perils of rule by the mullahs.
Finally, and most importantly, I learned through my own observation that the Iraqis are intelligent, religious and hard-working, qualities that can take them a long way in overcoming their present and past difficulties. I heard an Iraqi sheik say that his people had been traumatized by Saddam for thirty years, and we Americans should make allowances for that. Many of their current problems are manifestations of that trauma.
Their elections and political interactions may not meet our elevated standards, but they are at least as good or better than the elections we conducted in Chicago in the 1930's. And if you still insist on hating Bush, that is your right to continue to waste your time in that manner. Just don't blame the Iraqis for what Bush has done.
Monday, March 29, 2010
Back at the National Hurricane Conference
Last year the National Hurricane Conference was in Austin, Texas. I think. I have been to so many it's hard to remember. The most memorable Conference (in retrospect) was in New Orleans in April, 2005. That was the last time that I saw the Big Easy before it was destroyed by Hurrcane Katrina five months later. Fortunately for me, the Conference this year returns once again to Orlando.
I spent the first day listening to presentations organized by New York City Officringse of Emergency Management and the New, New Jersey and Connecitcut Regional Catastrophic Planning Project. FEMA has been spending $35 million a year the last four years to support ten of these catastrophic planning inititives across the country. From 2007 to 2009 I worked on the Florida Catastrophic Planning project, which developed a plan to respond to a Category 5 hurricane striking south Florida. The detailed consequences document for this storm was almost 100 pages and made for grim reading.
As the representatives from New York City made clear, and I agree, the big advantage of these planning intitiatives is that it brings representatives from local, state and federal jurisdictions together in order to solve very tough problems. And New York City would face a very tough problem if it were struck by a Category 3 hurricane, as happened in 1938, when a lot fewer people lived there.
I spent the first day listening to presentations organized by New York City Officringse of Emergency Management and the New, New Jersey and Connecitcut Regional Catastrophic Planning Project. FEMA has been spending $35 million a year the last four years to support ten of these catastrophic planning inititives across the country. From 2007 to 2009 I worked on the Florida Catastrophic Planning project, which developed a plan to respond to a Category 5 hurricane striking south Florida. The detailed consequences document for this storm was almost 100 pages and made for grim reading.
As the representatives from New York City made clear, and I agree, the big advantage of these planning intitiatives is that it brings representatives from local, state and federal jurisdictions together in order to solve very tough problems. And New York City would face a very tough problem if it were struck by a Category 3 hurricane, as happened in 1938, when a lot fewer people lived there.
Saturday, February 27, 2010
What I did for the Haitian Earthquake
I have this love-hate relationship with my Blackberry. I am old enough to remember the pleasure in receiving and reading letters (remember those?), especially when I was overseas. The Blackberry is a cascade of these little pleasures, instantly available on my hip. The content of the messages are irrelevant. What is important is that they were sent to ME.
On the other hand, every time I hear my Blackberry buzzing at an odd hour, I am reminded of the reason that the State of Florida has issued me this device: to contact me in case of a disaster. And at those odd hours, as I am pulling my Blackberry from it's case to read the message, I wonder if this will be the message that changes my life: the summons to the state emergency operations center (EOC) to respond to the Big One.
I have been summoned in some way similar many times before. In 1998, before anyone even heard of Blackberries, I was driving my daughter to school in the morning when I heard on NPR that 5 tornadoes had struck central Florida in the early morning, with widespread damage and casualties. I made a mental note to head over to the state EOC after dropping off my daughter to see what was up. Seconds later, I felt the vibration of the pager on my belt. Because I was driving I handed the pager to my daughter and asked her to read aloud the text message. "Report to the EOC," she read aloud.
On the morning of January 13, 2010 I received an email with the same instructions. I had heard about the Haitian earthquake the night before but didn't expect to be involved because it was in another country. I was wrong. I had not really read the state's Repatriation plan.
Over the next three weeks I was to learn a lot about Repatriation, and the way the federal government functions and doesn't function during a disaster. But most of all, I was to be reminded (once again!) that Florida has the best state emergency operations team in the country.
Repatriation is the return of U.S. citizens from overseas after a disaster. The Department of State is responsible for orchestrating this movement. State tasks the federal Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) to take care of these citizens as they arrive, possibly with nothing more than the clothes on their back. Within HHS the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) signs an agreement with a state agency designated by the Governor to perform the Repatriation services. In Florida, the Governor designated the Department of Children & Families (DCF).
According to the state Repatriation plan, which is based on the draft November 2008 Office of Refugee Resettlement Plan (ORR), DCF would meet the returning U.S. citizens at the designated airport in Florida and assist these citizens in moving onward to their homes, primarily by lending them money for airfare, hotel rooms and food. The recipient of the money would sign an agreement promising to pay the federal government back, receive their support, and then move on their way home. The federal plan also says that federal ORR will reimburse state DCF and all other state and local agencies for any expenses related to this federal operation.
Who pays, as in so many other things in life, is an extremely important part of the plan.
Unfortunately, when I arrived at the state emergency operations center the morning of Wednesday, January 13 I was not familiar with either the federal plan or the state plan. Not very many other people at the state EOC were familiar with the plans either. I went from meeting to meeting, as we all tried to get organized to support this federal mission, leafing through the plans while trying to listen to people telling me new information. Nobody in any of these meetings had ever done this before.
That afternoon we crammed into a room at the state EOC to listen to a conference call with the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) and two other states. ORR told us that there would be no Repatriation from Haiti, and if there was, then they would take care of it. This was the first of several times that we received misinformation from ORR.
Fortunately for all concerned, we didn't believe her. We were watching the news along with everyone else, and we knew that the people on the island were in serious trouble and would be desperate to get out and return to the United States. The state EOC remained at a partial activation, and we returned there the next day with the expectation that something was going to happen,
And at 5 PM Thursday afternoon, January 14, something did happen, We received a phone call from ORR (the same person who assured us the previous day that there would be no Repatriation) that a planeload of U.S. citizens, some possibly with "medical issues," was bound for Miami, would arrive in two hours, and could we possibly meet the plane and provide any necessary assistance? With a shake of our heads, we sprang into action.
Within thirty minutes we had set up a conference call with federal ORR, the state EOC, Miami-Dade county emergency management and the Miami airport to begin the coordination to receive the flight. DCF had to round up a reception committee (this was after 5 PM, mind you) and get them to the airport by 7 PM. I distinctly remember, in the confusion, someone on a cell phone saying, "Everyone is meeting at baggage claim fourteen," as they struggled to get everyone linked together at the airport.
And after that, every day, at all hours, the planes kept coming: large Boeing aircraft chartered by someone, one and two engine private planes, and finally, US Air Force C-130 and C-17 aircraft. And with one or two exceptions, they were all coming to Florida. Despite numerous desperate phone calls and emails to everyone in the federal government we could think of, no one was able to tell us when these planes were coming, where in Florida they were going, and how many people were on board. I can understand this not happening the first few days, but after one week? Two weeks? Three weeks? It took three weeks before we finally received good, reliable flight information from any source other than the ones we were able to create ourselves.
In the meantime, we were left to our own devices. A number of knowledgeable people put their heads together and created what we called our Flight Following cell. The cell was established at the state EOC and ran 24 hours a day. The cell had a video feed from Miami's Air Traffic Control Center. As the planes took off from Port-a-Prince their radar signature indicated their destination. As these planes were identified, the tower in Miami called them and requested information on the number of persons on board, and whether any medical or other special needs were required on arrival.
All of this information was entered by the Flight Following Cell into a spreadsheet in Google Docs. With the information "in the clouds" the people at the receiving airports in Florida could access this spreadsheet and plan on having the necessary resources available to meet the arriving flights. The establishment and continued operation of this cell enabled us to stabilize the operation and meet the needs of the survivors as they arrived from Haiti. A large number of organizations contributed people to staff this cell, but of particular note and assistance (because we so rarely worked with them) was the Federal Aviation Administration and the Customs & Border Police, two federal agencies that really helped us out.
The Department of State declared the repatriation to be over on February 19. Ultimately, over 25,000 U.S. and foreign nationals on over a thousand flights arrived in Florida for onward movement to their homes. The Department of Children and Families gave financial assistance to almost seven thousand citizens. The American Red Cross fed over 13,000 meals and 55,000 snacks. Almost 700 injured Haitians were evacuated to Florida hospitals.
I played a small part in Operation Haiti Relief, but I was proud of the part I played. And I was proud of the many people throughout the state who made this operation a success.
On the other hand, every time I hear my Blackberry buzzing at an odd hour, I am reminded of the reason that the State of Florida has issued me this device: to contact me in case of a disaster. And at those odd hours, as I am pulling my Blackberry from it's case to read the message, I wonder if this will be the message that changes my life: the summons to the state emergency operations center (EOC) to respond to the Big One.
I have been summoned in some way similar many times before. In 1998, before anyone even heard of Blackberries, I was driving my daughter to school in the morning when I heard on NPR that 5 tornadoes had struck central Florida in the early morning, with widespread damage and casualties. I made a mental note to head over to the state EOC after dropping off my daughter to see what was up. Seconds later, I felt the vibration of the pager on my belt. Because I was driving I handed the pager to my daughter and asked her to read aloud the text message. "Report to the EOC," she read aloud.
On the morning of January 13, 2010 I received an email with the same instructions. I had heard about the Haitian earthquake the night before but didn't expect to be involved because it was in another country. I was wrong. I had not really read the state's Repatriation plan.
Over the next three weeks I was to learn a lot about Repatriation, and the way the federal government functions and doesn't function during a disaster. But most of all, I was to be reminded (once again!) that Florida has the best state emergency operations team in the country.
Repatriation is the return of U.S. citizens from overseas after a disaster. The Department of State is responsible for orchestrating this movement. State tasks the federal Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) to take care of these citizens as they arrive, possibly with nothing more than the clothes on their back. Within HHS the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) signs an agreement with a state agency designated by the Governor to perform the Repatriation services. In Florida, the Governor designated the Department of Children & Families (DCF).
According to the state Repatriation plan, which is based on the draft November 2008 Office of Refugee Resettlement Plan (ORR), DCF would meet the returning U.S. citizens at the designated airport in Florida and assist these citizens in moving onward to their homes, primarily by lending them money for airfare, hotel rooms and food. The recipient of the money would sign an agreement promising to pay the federal government back, receive their support, and then move on their way home. The federal plan also says that federal ORR will reimburse state DCF and all other state and local agencies for any expenses related to this federal operation.
Who pays, as in so many other things in life, is an extremely important part of the plan.
Unfortunately, when I arrived at the state emergency operations center the morning of Wednesday, January 13 I was not familiar with either the federal plan or the state plan. Not very many other people at the state EOC were familiar with the plans either. I went from meeting to meeting, as we all tried to get organized to support this federal mission, leafing through the plans while trying to listen to people telling me new information. Nobody in any of these meetings had ever done this before.
That afternoon we crammed into a room at the state EOC to listen to a conference call with the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) and two other states. ORR told us that there would be no Repatriation from Haiti, and if there was, then they would take care of it. This was the first of several times that we received misinformation from ORR.
Fortunately for all concerned, we didn't believe her. We were watching the news along with everyone else, and we knew that the people on the island were in serious trouble and would be desperate to get out and return to the United States. The state EOC remained at a partial activation, and we returned there the next day with the expectation that something was going to happen,
And at 5 PM Thursday afternoon, January 14, something did happen, We received a phone call from ORR (the same person who assured us the previous day that there would be no Repatriation) that a planeload of U.S. citizens, some possibly with "medical issues," was bound for Miami, would arrive in two hours, and could we possibly meet the plane and provide any necessary assistance? With a shake of our heads, we sprang into action.
Within thirty minutes we had set up a conference call with federal ORR, the state EOC, Miami-Dade county emergency management and the Miami airport to begin the coordination to receive the flight. DCF had to round up a reception committee (this was after 5 PM, mind you) and get them to the airport by 7 PM. I distinctly remember, in the confusion, someone on a cell phone saying, "Everyone is meeting at baggage claim fourteen," as they struggled to get everyone linked together at the airport.
And after that, every day, at all hours, the planes kept coming: large Boeing aircraft chartered by someone, one and two engine private planes, and finally, US Air Force C-130 and C-17 aircraft. And with one or two exceptions, they were all coming to Florida. Despite numerous desperate phone calls and emails to everyone in the federal government we could think of, no one was able to tell us when these planes were coming, where in Florida they were going, and how many people were on board. I can understand this not happening the first few days, but after one week? Two weeks? Three weeks? It took three weeks before we finally received good, reliable flight information from any source other than the ones we were able to create ourselves.
In the meantime, we were left to our own devices. A number of knowledgeable people put their heads together and created what we called our Flight Following cell. The cell was established at the state EOC and ran 24 hours a day. The cell had a video feed from Miami's Air Traffic Control Center. As the planes took off from Port-a-Prince their radar signature indicated their destination. As these planes were identified, the tower in Miami called them and requested information on the number of persons on board, and whether any medical or other special needs were required on arrival.
All of this information was entered by the Flight Following Cell into a spreadsheet in Google Docs. With the information "in the clouds" the people at the receiving airports in Florida could access this spreadsheet and plan on having the necessary resources available to meet the arriving flights. The establishment and continued operation of this cell enabled us to stabilize the operation and meet the needs of the survivors as they arrived from Haiti. A large number of organizations contributed people to staff this cell, but of particular note and assistance (because we so rarely worked with them) was the Federal Aviation Administration and the Customs & Border Police, two federal agencies that really helped us out.
The Department of State declared the repatriation to be over on February 19. Ultimately, over 25,000 U.S. and foreign nationals on over a thousand flights arrived in Florida for onward movement to their homes. The Department of Children and Families gave financial assistance to almost seven thousand citizens. The American Red Cross fed over 13,000 meals and 55,000 snacks. Almost 700 injured Haitians were evacuated to Florida hospitals.
I played a small part in Operation Haiti Relief, but I was proud of the part I played. And I was proud of the many people throughout the state who made this operation a success.
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
Repatriation from Haiti
Since the day after the Haiti earthquake January 12 I have pulled 10-12 hour shifts at Florida's State Emergency Operations Center. Why? First, its my job. Second, the state had a mission to support the repatriation of U.S. citizens from the disaster afflicted island.
Repatriation is a federal mission, initiated by the Department of State, and funded by the federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). In the federal plan, which I read in haste for the first time last week, HHS establishes an agreement with a state agency designated by the Governor (in this case, the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF)) to care for U.S. citizens returned to the United States due to war or natural disaster. When required, DCF loans these citizens the money to get some food, a hotel or an airplane ticket home.
At first, HHS told us that the State would not be required to perform this repatriation mission. That illusion ended last Thursday night when we received a phone call from HHS at 5 PM that a flight was due into Miami in 2 hours and we were needed to be on hand in case any citizens needed our help.
Since then, we have provided assistance to over a thousand citizens, and we expect to continue this mission for several more weeks.
Repatriation is a federal mission, initiated by the Department of State, and funded by the federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). In the federal plan, which I read in haste for the first time last week, HHS establishes an agreement with a state agency designated by the Governor (in this case, the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF)) to care for U.S. citizens returned to the United States due to war or natural disaster. When required, DCF loans these citizens the money to get some food, a hotel or an airplane ticket home.
At first, HHS told us that the State would not be required to perform this repatriation mission. That illusion ended last Thursday night when we received a phone call from HHS at 5 PM that a flight was due into Miami in 2 hours and we were needed to be on hand in case any citizens needed our help.
Since then, we have provided assistance to over a thousand citizens, and we expect to continue this mission for several more weeks.
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